VSCORE is what bonds node operators, carries fee value, and governs VaultScore once the network needs a coordination layer beyond "trust the team." This page describes the design as it stands today — issued but not distributed, not for sale, and not final until it clears legal and economic review.
Four jobs, and the design exists to serve them, not the other way around:
Issued as an XRPL Multi-Purpose Token (MPT) — XRPL's standard for compliant utility-token issuance, with configurable authorization, locking, and clawback flags a plain IOU/trustline token doesn't offer cleanly. That matters for a network with slashing: a slashed stake or a sanctioned wallet can be restricted at the protocol level, not bolted on after the fact.
Fixed supply is deliberate: a network whose entire pitch is "trustworthy, hard-to-manipulate scores" is a bad place to also run discretionary token inflation that stakers have to second-guess.
| Bucket | Supply | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| Ecosystem & node incentives | 38% | Bootstrap score-node operators and early integrations (§5). |
| Protocol treasury / DAO | 20% | Grants, audits, ongoing development — spent only via passed governance votes. |
| Core contributors | 15% | Founding team and early builders. 12-month cliff, then linear over 36 months — nothing liquid in year one. |
| Strategic capital reserve | 12% | Not sold as tokens. Early capital is raised as equity/SAFE in the operating company; this reserve backs counsel-reviewed, token-side instruments for those backers post-launch — never a direct token sale. |
| Liquidity provisioning | 8% | Seeds the VSCORE/XRP and VSCORE/RLUSD pools on the native AMM. |
| Community rewards | 7% | A retroactive airdrop to people who already used the network — Testnet Credential holders, early node operators, early integration partners. Earned, not purchased. |
No team or backer tokens are liquid in year one, and no bucket here is sold to the public for money — the two design choices that matter most for keeping VSCORE a usage-linked utility token rather than an investment contract (§7).
A lender or vault manager pays a fee every time it queries a wallet's or agent's score:
Every fee routes through the native AMM into VSCORE, then splits:
| Destination | Share | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Active score-node stakers | 45% | Direct reward for doing the scoring work. |
| Burn | 35% | Ties long-run token value to real query volume, not emissions. |
| Protocol treasury | 20% | Grants, audits, ongoing model development. |
Honest caveat: at low early volume, burn is negligible next to the node-incentive emissions flowing out at the same time (§5) — the split is a lever governance can retune, not a number that makes the mechanism self-sustaining on day one.
Minimum stake to run a score node: 50,000 VSCORE, locked for active service plus a 21-day unbonding period — long enough for a slashing dispute on recent attestations to resolve before stake exits.
Delegation: holders who don't want to run a node can delegate stake to an operator, sharing its rewards and its slashing risk — how the network gets real economic security without every holder running infrastructure.
| Condition | Penalty |
|---|---|
| Provably incorrect attestation | 10% of stake |
| Collusion between nodes | 100% of stake |
| Extended downtime / missed SLA | 1% per incident, capped |
The ecosystem pool (§3) releases to node operators and integration partners on a four-year, front-loaded decay — roughly 40% / 27% / 19% / 14% by year — so incentives are richest exactly when the network has the least fee revenue of its own to pay for security.
Token-weighted voting on required data models, fee parameters, the burn/reward/treasury split, slashing-dispute outcomes, and treasury grants — with two constraints aimed at avoiding common DeFi governance failure modes:
Not legal advice — the reasoning behind the choices above, stated plainly. The fee-burn mechanism is structured as a usage-linked burn tied to a specific utility (paying for and securing attestation services), not a profit-distribution promise to holders. The allocation in §3 deliberately keeps every token either earned (node rewards, the community airdrop) or vested against ongoing work (core contributors) — nobody pays cash for VSCORE itself. Capital for the company building this is raised the conventional way, as equity, which is a well-understood legal path rather than a novel token-securities question. None of this is a substitute for counsel actually reviewing the mechanism before anything real launches.
Every number on this page is illustrative — a coherent starting point, not a settled spec. Before anything is real: